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MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE ADA: FOLLOWING THE PATH 
BLAZED BY STATE COURTS TO EXTEND PROTECTION 
ABSTRACT 
Thirty-three states across the country have legalized the use of medical 
marijuana for disabled individuals. Nevertheless, medical marijuana’s status in 
the workplace still faces significant uncertainty, because the current 
understanding of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) categorizes medical 
marijuana use as an “illegal use of drugs.” Thus, the ADA provides no 
protection for disabled employees seeking to treat their condition with medical 
marijuana. In recent years, courts deciding cases involving state medical 
marijuana and anti-discrimination statutes have brought a more patient-
centered and pragmatic approach to the issue. These courts have offered an 
interpretation of the “illegal use of drugs” provision of the ADA that is both 
practical and in line with the purpose of the ADA: to protect discrimination 
against disabled individuals. This approach centers on the idea that the ADA 
was never intended to regulate drug use outside the workplace, nor was it 
intended to exclude from protection those individuals using drugs under 
supervision of licensed professionals. This Comment argues this approach 
should be adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
and that employee use of medical marijuana should be protected and treated in 
the same way as other medications with significant side effects. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, California became the first state to legalize medical marijuana with 
fifty-five percent of the electorate in favor.1 In 2018, Missouri became the thirty-
third state to legalize medical marijuana, and it did so with sixty-six percent of 
voters behind it.2 Clearly, public opinion about the use of medical marijuana is 
changing. Despite this, marijuana remains a Schedule I substance under the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), making its use illegal under federal law.3 This 
has created a disjunction between federal policy and societal reality. This 
disjunction surfaces when employers rely on federal drug policy to summarily 
discharge workers who legally use medical marijuana under state law. Current 
polls show as many as 94 percent of Americans support the legalization of 
medical marijuana,4 and there are 2.5 million registered patients. However, 
courts have been slow to grant protection to the 2.5 million registered patients 
that have taken their claims to court.5 One of those patients was Cristina 
Barbuto.  
In the summer of 2014, Ms. Barbuto was contacted by a recruiter from 
Advantaged Sales and Marketing (ASM) regarding a job opportunity with the 
company.6 After interviewing and accepting the job offer, Ms. Barbuto was 
notified of her need to take a mandatory drug test.7 Ms. Barbuto immediately 
informed the company that she would test positive for marijuana.8 She explained 
that she had Crohn’s disease and irritable bowel syndrome, and that under the 
care of her physician, she treated her disability by using medical marijuana two 
to three times a week.9 Ms. Barbuto never used marijuana at work and did not 
consume marijuana before work.10 Her supervisor informed her that the 
medicinal use of marijuana “should not be a problem,” and later that day he even 
 
 1. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG. (Mar. 5, 2019), http://www.ncs 
l.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
 2. Andy Marso, Missouri Voters Approve Medical Marijuana with a Constitutional 
Amendment, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-govern 
ment/election/article221150305.html; Sarah Rense, Here Are All the States That Have Legalized 
Weed in the U.S., ESQUIRE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.esquire.com/lifestyle/a21719186/all-states 
-that-legalized-weed-in-us/. 
 3. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(1)(c)(10) (2012). 
 4. Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Poll, U.S. Voter Support for Marijuana Hits New High; 
Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; 76 Percent Say Their Finances are Excellent or Good 
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://poll.qu.edu/nationna/release-detail?ReleaseID=2453. 
 5. Medical Marijuana Patient Numbers, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (2018), 
https://www.mpp.org/issues/medical-marijuana/state-by-state-medical-marijuana-laws/medical-
marijuana-patient-numbers/. 
 6. Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 78 N.E.3d 37, 41 (Mass. 2017). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE ADA 393 
called Ms. Barbuto to confirm her use would not be problematic.11 Following 
the drug test, Ms. Barbuto attended training and was assigned a work location.12 
After completing her first day of work, she went home excited about this new 
opportunity.13 That evening, she received a call from ASM’s Human Resources 
representative informing her that the company was terminating her for testing 
positive for marijuana, with the purported rationale being “we follow federal 
law, not state law.”14 
Nearly three years after these events took place, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court found in Ms. Barbuto’s favor, rejecting the employer’s argument 
that medical marijuana is not a reasonable accommodation under state anti-
discrimination law because marijuana is illegal under federal law.15 The court 
reasoned that finding the requested accommodation of allowing continued 
employment despite failing the drug test to be unreasonable per se based on 
federal law “would not be respectful of Massachusetts voters, shared by the 
legislatures or voters in the vast majority of States, that marijuana has an 
accepted medical use for some patients’ suffering from a variety of 
disabilities.”16 The court also reasoned that because the employee bears the risk 
of prosecution, the employer cannot claim federal law prevents making an 
exception to his drug use policy for a person using medical marijuana.  
This Comment will argue that the recent success Christina Barbuto had in 
claiming disability discrimination based on state anti-discrimination law can and 
should be applied to federal employment discrimination law—the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA). As a primer, Part II will explain the current 
landscape of medical marijuana in the U.S. by laying out the federal policy 
rationale that has endured despite overwhelming public support. It will then 
explore how these conflicting policies create unique problems in the workplace, 
largely because of the inability of current drug testing methods to accurately 
determine marijuana impairment rather than use. 
Part III will begin by outlining the ADA’s protection of qualified individuals 
with a disability. It will then explain how medical marijuana has not been 
afforded protection under the ADA, because it is treated as an “illegal use of 
drugs” before providing policy-based and practical rationales for interpreting it 
differently. Part III will review and classify state medical marijuana and anti-
discrimination statutes in to three categories based on statutory language 
regarding an employer’s obligation to accommodate a disabled individual that 
has been prescribed medical marijuana. Finally, it will analyze the developing 
 
 11. Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 41. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 50–51. 
 16. Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 46. 
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case law in jurisdictions with the anti-discrimination provisions and compare the 
outcomes to earlier court decisions in states without these protections to 
demonstrate the importance of explicit and unambiguous statutory language 
granting or denying protection to patients in the employment context.  
Part IV will argue that the rationale put forth recently by the courts that have 
favored plaintiff-employees should be applied to the ADA. These courts drew 
several conclusions about various sub-provisions of the ADA that contest crucial 
arguments for pre-emption of these state laws. Specifically, the courts concluded 
the ADA was never intended to exclude individuals using drugs under 
supervision of licensed professionals, nor is it intended to regulate employee 
drug use that is entirely outside the workplace. This interpretation is supported 
by a policy-based rationale that the ADA is not serving its purpose—to protect 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the workplace—by 
allowing federal drug policy law to dictate workplace dilemmas, and that it is 
erroneous to attempt to delineate discrimination based on an individual’s 
disability from the treatment of their disability. Finally, it will provide a 
framework that argues medical marijuana should be treated the same as other 
prescription drugs with significant side effects.  
II.  PUBLIC SUPPORT, ARCHAIC POLICY, AND PRACTICAL REALITIES OF THE 
WORKPLACE 
What was once considered the counter-culture has become the mainstream. 
In the vast majority of states, marijuana is legalized for medical use, recreational 
use, or both.17 Recent polls report that nearly sixty percent of the country 
supports legalization of recreational marijuana, and overwhelmingly, ninety-
four percent of Americans favor legalization of medical marijuana.18 While state 
legislators and their citizens continue to push the issue forward, a few practical 
realities continue to stifle its progress. Employees are left to navigate a 
complicated system plagued by a combination of outdated federal regulation, 
ineffective drug testing methods, and a complete disregard of the reasons why 
these individuals are granted a prescription for medical marijuana in the first 
place.  
A. The Controlled Substances Act 
Despite the overwhelming support for medical marijuana, the CSA 
continues to criminalize the use of medical marijuana in the U.S. Congress 
enacted the CSA as Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 197019 and continues to enforce it today. The purpose of the CSA 
 
 17. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 1. 
 18. Quinnipiac Univ. Poll., supra note 4. 
 19. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (1970); Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE ADA 395 
is to regulate and facilitate the manufacture, distribution, and use of controlled 
substances for legitimate medical, scientific, research, and industrial purposes.20 
It is also designed to prevent these substances from being diverted for illegal 
purposes.21 CSA regulations classify various plants, drugs, and chemicals (such 
as narcotics, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids) into 
one of five different schedules. A substance’s classification depends on its 
potential for abuse, accepted medical use, and safety in treatment.22  
Schedule I substances are deemed to have no medical utility and are only 
authorized in limited circumstances, while Schedules II, III, IV, and V have 
recognized medical uses and may be manufactured, distributed, and used in 
accordance with the CSA. The CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug, 
along with LSD and heroin, saying it has “a high potential for abuse, no currently 
accepted medical use, and a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug.”23 This 
classification is seemingly at odds with findings of many in the medical 
community, which has supported marijuana as a ‘safe and effective’ means of 
treating chronic pain.24 Even at the time of the CSA’s enactment, the Schedule 
I classification of marijuana was controversial because of the lack of research 
conducted to that point.25 Marijuana was immediately scheduled, and unlike 
newly discovered drugs, it went without evaluation by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).26 Even today, the 
government almost entirely refrains from funding research regarding the 
therapeutic benefits of marijuana. In fact, there is only one marijuana research 
facility granted by federal authority, and the research is used to study the 
negative effects of marijuana.27 
Marijuana scheduling has been contemplated a number of times since then, 
with the latest being in 2016.28 These efforts began in 1972 when the National 
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws petitioned to reclassify 
 
 20. See Mission, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/mission (last visited Apr. 
13, 2019) (setting forth the Drug Enforcement Administration’s mission “to enforce the controlled 
substances laws and regulations of the United States”). 
 21. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012). 
 22. Id. § 812. 
 23. Tyler Duff, Nip it in the Bud: Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act 
Does Not Provide Employees a Legal Remedy for Adverse Action Based Upon Use in Compliance 
with the Statute, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 196 (2015). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Annaliese Smith, Marijuana as a Schedule I Substance: Political Ploy or Accepted 
Science?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1137, 1137–38, 1148 (2000). 
 27. See Marijuana Research,  UNIV. MISS., https://pharmacy.olemiss.edu/marijuana/ (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
 28. See generally Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 53,688 (proposed Aug. 12, 2016). 
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marijuana to a Schedule II drug, so it could be legally prescribed by physicians.29 
Sixteen years later, Chief Administrative Judge Francis L. Young ruled in favor 
of reclassifying cannabis, stating: 
[M]arijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active 
substances known to man. By any measure of rational analysis marijuana can be 
safely used within a supervised routine of medical care. . . . It would be 
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious for DEA to continue to stand between 
those sufferers and the benefits of this substance in light of the evidence in this 
record.30  
Judge Young’s determination was overruled by the DEA administrator in 
1989,31 and the numerous petitions since that time have been equally unavailing 
in persuading the agency to rethink its classification.32 Because of this 
classification, the CSA prohibits the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, and 
possession of marijuana even when a state authorizes its use to treat medical 
conditions.33 
How can the states legalize a Schedule I substance under the CSA? This 
question was answered by the Supreme Court in 2005 in the now well-known 
case of Gonzales v. Raich.34 The case was brought by Angel Raich, an Oakland 
native who suffered from scoliosis, a brain tumor, chronic nausea, and other 
ailments.35 Her physician recommended using marijuana to stimulate her 
appetite and obtain relief from severe pain.36 Raich followed her doctor’s advice, 
acting in a manner that was legal under California state law but illegal under 
federal law.37 In 2002, she sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
to prevent the federal government from interfering with her medical treatment 
and prosecuting her under the CSA.38 The Supreme Court held in favor of the 
Department of Justice, finding that federal law did not exceed congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause to criminalize the cultivation and possession 
of marijuana for medical use anywhere in the country.39 The Supreme Court 
 
 29. Paul Armentano, Time to Remove Marijuana from the Controlled Substances Act, THE 
Hill (June 16, 2016), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/uncategorized/283710-time-to-remove 
-marijuana-from-the-controlled-substances-act. 
 30. Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision 
of Administrative Law Judge, In the Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, Dept. of Justice, 
Drug Enforcement Admin. No. 86-22 (Sept. 1988). 
 31. 54 Fed. Reg. 53767 (Dec. 29, 1989); see also Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 
15 F.3d 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 32. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005). 
 33. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). 
 34. See generally Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 1. 
 35. Id. at 6. 
 36. Id. at 7. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 7. 
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found the fact that California and eight other states had legalized marijuana did 
not affect federal law enforcement in any way.40 While this opinion drastically 
widened congressional power under the Commerce Clause, more importantly 
for our purposes, the Court did not find that the CSA invalidated the contrary 
state law.  
The purpose of this Comment is not to advocate for or against the 
legalization of medical marijuana. Instead, it will operate under the assumption 
that because medical marijuana use will likely continue to be legalized by states 
across the country, and because the Gonzales decision did not invalidate these 
statutes, the disjunction between federal and state law will continue generating 
questions about protections for disabled employees who use medical marijuana. 
B. Managing the Practical Realities of Drug Testing 
Another issue plaguing medical marijuana’s status in the workplace is the 
prevalence of drug testing combined with its ineffectiveness at determining 
impairment. The ADA provides employers wide discretion in drug testing their 
employees. Because “tests for illegal drugs are not subject to the same 
restrictions as medical examinations,” employers are permitted to test for the 
presence of marijuana. 41 
Fifty-six percent of U.S. employers require applicants to take a drug test 
prior to becoming an employee.42 Additionally, “[t]he annual cost to American 
companies for drug testing is about $3,750,500,000.”43 Impairment is also 
extremely difficult to evaluate, largely because the most common method of 
drug testing, urinalysis, does not analyze the amount of tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC) in a person’s system.44 THC is the active ingredient in marijuana that 
gives it the psychotherapeutic effects.45 Instead, a drug test searches for the 
metabolites of THC. These metabolites are present in the body long after the 
effects of marijuana have worn off and can leave a person testing positive weeks 
after use.46 Therefore, even those using medical marijuana occasionally to treat 
chronic pain will likely test positive for weeks after their last use.47 To illustrate, 
imagine an epileptic who has a seizure on May 1st. In treating her, the physician 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(1) (2012); Russell Rendall, Note, Medical Marijuana and the ADA: 
Removing Barriers to Employment for Disabled Individuals, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 315, 330–31 
(2012). 
 42. Melissa Wylie, Surprising Stats on Drugs in the Workplace, PSYCHEMEDICS (Jan. 29, 
2018), https://www.psychemedics.com/blog/2018/01/surprising-stats-drugs-workplace/. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Bradley M. Bakker, Employers Need to Manage Medical Marijuana Issues, 72 J. MO. B. 
186, 188 (2016). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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prescribes a cannabis-based oil, a legal substance under the state’s law. 
Fortunately, after this treatment her symptoms subside, and she goes without a 
seizure for the next four weeks. On June 1st, her employer requires her to 
undergo a random drug test, the results of which test positive for cannabis 
despite having taken it only once and nearly a month prior. While this illustration 
may seem unrealistic, in reality it is a common occurrence. Christina Barbuto 
faced a similar situation, discussed in the introduction to this Comment. Ms. 
Barbuto used medical marijuana before bed and only two-to-three times a week. 
She was never impaired at work and never brought any of her medicine to work. 
Yet, her employer terminated her for a positive drug test showing use of 
marijuana. Ms. Barbuto is one of countless patients who fall victim to the 
inability of current drug testing methods to accurately gauge impairment rather 
than use.  
III.  FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA 
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The ADA is a civil rights law that prohibits discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.48 The purpose of the ADA is to ensure “that people 
with disabilities have the same rights and opportunities as everyone else.”49  
Title I of the ADA prohibits private employers with fifteen or more employees 
from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in job 
application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, job training, 
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.50  
1. Qualified Individual with a Disability 
An individual may bring a claim under the ADA if he or she is a qualified 
individual with a disability. A qualified individual is one who—with or without 
reasonable accommodation—can perform the essential functions of the job in 
question.51 Under the ADA, disability is defined as “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, a person 
who has a history or record of such impairment, or a person who is perceived by 
others as having such an impairment.”52 In 2008, the ADA was amended with 
the intent of redefining the term “major life activities” and making it clear that 
the definition of disability should be interpreted broadly.53 Despite the 
 
 48. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 49. What is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK, https://adata. 
org/learn-about-ada (last visited Apr. 13, 2019). 
 50. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). 
 51. Id. § 12111(8). 
 52. Id. § 12102(1). 
 53. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12211 (2012). Accordingly, under 
the amendment “major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE ADA 399 
amendments, disabled individuals who would otherwise clearly fall within the 
broadened definition of disability have been left without protection from the 
ADA due to treating their underlying disability with medical marijuana.  
In the present context, medical marijuana users are not seeking to have their 
prescription drug use treated as a disability. These patients have underlying 
disabilities, which serve as the basis for their ADA claims. In order to be 
qualified for the use of medical marijuana, these individuals must have been 
found to have an underlying disability as defined by state law. For instance, in 
Florida, an individual may qualify if they have cancer, epilepsy, glaucoma, 
HIV/AIDS, post-traumatic stress disorder, or Parkinson’s disease.54 Thus, in 
reality, in any state with legal medical marijuana, it is impossible to gain patient 
status without an underlying disability. So, while some courts have implied 
otherwise, the ADA addresses drug use as disability and says nothing about drug 
use as treatment.  
2. Exclusion of Individuals Engaging in the “Illegal Use of Drugs” 
Despite the expansive definition of who is a “qualified individual with a 
disability,” an employee currently engaged in illegal use of drugs is not covered 
by the ADA when an employer takes adverse action on the basis of such use. 
The ADA defines “illegal use of drugs” as follows:  
[T]he use of drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under the 
controlled substance act… such term does not include the use of a drug under 
supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by 
the Controlled Substance Act or other provisions of federal law.55  
For purposes of this Comment, the question becomes, does everything 
unlawful under the CSA constitute an illegal use of drugs under the ADA? Or 
can the ADA be interpreted to hold a narrower view of what constitutes an illegal 
use of drugs? Currently, the ADA “is silent as to whether current use of 
marijuana can be reasonable accommodation for a disability (other than drug 
addiction).”56 To date, this issue has come up only a few times in federal court, 
as discussed below. While the cases that follow are unreported, they do provide 
some clarity as to medical marijuana’s place in the ADA. 
 
manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, 
breathing, learning, readings, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. § 
12102(2)(A). Further, “a major life activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, 
including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, 
bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” Id. § 
12102(2)(B). 
 54. FLA. STAT. § 381.986(2) (2017). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A) (2012). 
 56. LINDSEY A. WHITE ET AL., STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES – SMOKY LINES: WHETHER TO 
ACCOMMODATE EMPLOYEES’ USE OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA MAY NOW DEPEND ON STATE LAW 
(Wolters Kluwer 2018). 
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Following the court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, discussed in Part II, in 
Barber v. Gonzales James Barber filed a motion for reconsideration and motion 
for distinction from Gonzales.57 Barber was evicted from university housing 
because of his marijuana use and argued his eviction was unlawful because his 
marijuana use was for medical reasons.58 Barber argued that while the 
university’s actions were arguably consistent with the CSA, the conduct was 
unlawful under the ADA.59 His contention was that Congress intended to limit 
the application of the CSA to non-disabled individuals engaged in unlawful use 
of drugs, and thus the ADA was intended to protect individuals utilizing drugs 
for medical purposes.60 The court acknowledged that at first glance, Barber’s 
construction of the “illegal use of drugs” provision seemed to support a right 
under the ADA to possess medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician 
of Washington.61 Yet, the court construed the second sentence of the 
provision—“[the term ‘illegal use of drugs’] does not include the use of a drug 
taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses 
authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of Federal 
law”— to require the use of the drug taken under the supervision of a licensed 
health care professional be consistent with the CSA.62 In denying the motions, 
the court found no claim can be made under the ADA when action is taken on 
the basis of his marijuana use because the term “individual with disability” does 
not include individuals engaged in illegal use of drugs.63 
While not an employment case, James v. City of Costa Mesa is also 
pertinent, because the district court denied an injunction based on its 
interpretation of the term “illegal use of drugs,” a definition that also applies to 
the employment subchapter.64 In James, several disabled individuals challenged 
ordinances of Costa Mesta and Lake Forest prohibiting the operation of medical 
marijuana dispensaries within their cities on grounds that it violated Title III of 
the ADA, which prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in places 
of public accommodation.65 The plaintiffs argued that their use of medical 
marijuana pursuant to the supervision of licensed healthcare professional was 
exempt from the ADA’s exclusion of coverage for individuals engaging in the 
 
 57. Barber v. Gonzales, No. CV-05-0173-EFS, 2005 WL 1607189, at *1 (E.D. Wash. July 1, 
2005). 
 58. However, Barber had previously been arrested for marijuana cultivation, and it is not 
completely clear whether he was actually a medical marijuana patient under supervision of a 
physician. Id. at *1–2. 
 59. Id. at *2. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Barber, 2005 WL 1607189, at *1 (emphasis omitted). 
 63. Id. at *2. 
 64. James v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 F.3d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 2012); see Kathleen Harvey, 
Protecting Medical Marijuana Users in the Workplace, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 209, 210 (2015). 
 65. James, 700 F.3d at 397. 
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illegal use of drugs, because the provision created two exceptions, one for 
supervised drug use by a licensed health care professional and a second for drug 
use authorized by the CSA or other federal laws.66 The court rejected this 
interpretation, instead adopting the cities’ argument that the provision offered a 
single exception for “uses authorized by the CSA or other provisions of Federal 
law,” and that the use of drugs under supervision of a licensed health care 
professional was intended to encompass the “CSA-authorized uses that involve 
professional supervision.”67 The court held that the language of “[the illegal use 
of drugs provision] lacks a plain meaning” and relying on an implicit 
relationship between the ADA and CSA found “the ADA does not protect 
against discrimination on the basis of marijuana use, even medical marijuana 
use supervised by a doctor in accordance with state law.”68 In other words, the 
ADA’s definition of “illegal use of drugs” mirrors the CSA, and therefore, does 
not afford protection to disabled individuals using medical marijuana under a 
licensed health care professional’s supervision.69 
3. Discrimination Based on Disability 
A disabled person bringing an ADA claim must demonstrate that he was 
subjected to discrimination “on the basis of disability.”70 Employers who choose 
to take action against medical marijuana users deny that such action is the result 
of the employee’s disability, but rather it is directed at that person’s conduct.71 
This creates the appearance that action is taken based on the employee’s 
behavior, use of marijuana, and not the underlying disability.72 However, there 
is strong reason to believe that such adverse action is prohibited by the ADA and 
employees should be protected. 
In the context of medical marijuana, discrimination usually involves an 
employer who knowingly does not provide a disabled employee a reasonable 
accommodation or denies employment to an individual who requires an 
accommodation.73 Examples of reasonable accommodations can include: 
modifying work schedules, changing materials or policies, making facilities 
more accessible, and changing job responsibilities, among others.74 Moreover, 
an employer’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodation can be 
overcome when such an accommodation would create undue hardship on the 
business or if the employee poses a direct threat to the health and safety of the 
 
 66. Id. at 398. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 397–98. 
 69. Id. at 398. 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
 71. Rendall, supra note 41, at 329. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
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work environment.75 Undue hardship is defined as “an action requiring 
significant difficulty or expense.”76 The ADA articulates a number of factors to 
be weighed in determining if it creates an undue hardship, including: (1) the 
nature and cost of the accommodation, (2) the financial commitment required to 
accommodate, (3) size of the business, (4) type and operations of the employer, 
and (5) the overall financial resources available to the employer.77 
In most cases, employers argue they would suffer undue hardship in 
providing the accommodation, and that making an exception to their policies for 
disabled employees using medical marijuana is inherently unreasonable due to 
its illegal status under the CSA. However, in analyzing the other factors, the 
proposed accommodation may be reasonable for many employers because (1) 
the cost is low and (2) the overall financial resources of the employer would not 
be affected.78 These two factors will depend upon the type of job, “because the 
side effects of marijuana will have a different impact depending upon the 
workplace or job requirements.”79 Further, “[a]bsent undue hardship, the ADA 
prohibits an employer from either refusing to accommodate or taking adverse 
action because of the need to accommodate an employee.”80 
Additionally, while an employer testing for marijuana is lawful under the 
ADA, if the results are used in a way that tends to “screen out” disabled persons, 
the employer is engaging in unlawful discrimination, absent a showing of 
business necessity.81 Business necessity is based on individualized 
circumstances, but it generally requires an employer to show that an employee 
cannot perform essential job functions or a showing that they pose a direct threat 
to the safety of the workplace.82 It should be recognized that in some cases, it 
may be appropriate to prohibit medical marijuana use, such as for bus drivers, 
pilots, or forklift operators.83 However, in many cases, it is hard to imagine an 
employee not being able to perform the essential functions of a position, 
especially when the drug is not used at or before work, such as customer services 
roles where the work does not involve overseeing the safety of others and takes 
place in an office setting.84 Further, accommodating qualified medical marijuana 
patients, even under the ADA, would not require an employer to entirely discard 
the discriminatory policy. Such a policy can still be enforced against all other 
 
 75. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 76. Id. § 12111(10)(A). 
 77. Id. § 12111(10)(B). 
 78. Rendall, supra note 41, at 330. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 331. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2012). 
 83. Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2009), rev’d in part, 
625 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 84. Id. at 770. 
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employees; an exception only needs to be made for the disabled employee. Thus, 
even if it is established that medical marijuana is not an illegal use of drugs, 
recreational use remains illegal and employers are entitled to test for it. 
B. Legal Protections Under State Law 
While disabled medical marijuana patients have found little success thus far 
in gaining protection through the ADA, states have been making their own 
means of determining how qualifying patients should be treated in the workplace 
through medical marijuana and anti-discrimination statutes. This section will 
classify the thirty-four jurisdictions that have legalized medical marijuana based 
on statutory language addressing the employer’s obligation to accommodate an 
employee who uses medical marijuana. It will then analyze the developing case 
law in these jurisdictions, which demonstrates the importance of definitive, 
explicit statutory language granting or denying protection to patients in the 
employment context. 
Thirty-four jurisdictions have taken different approaches in medical 
marijuana use in their anti-discrimination statutes. The main difference this 
section highlights is how the laws address the obligation to accommodate 
employee use of medical marijuana. These jurisdictions fall in to one of three 
primary categories:85 (1) explicitly requiring an employer to make a reasonable 
accommodation of medical marijuana users, (2) silent as to accommodations, 
but do allow employers to prohibit employee use in the workplace or impairment 
on work premises, and (3) explicitly do not require employers to provide 
accommodations on work premises or during work hours.  
1. Explicit Requirement to Make Reasonable Accommodation 
Of the thirty-four jurisdictions with legal medical marijuana, Nevada is the 
sole jurisdiction that explicitly requires an employer to attempt to make a 
reasonable accommodation of medical marijuana use for employees holding a 
“valid registry identification card.”86 However, this requirement can be 
overcome if the accommodation would (1) “pose a threat of harm or danger to 
persons or property,” (2) impose an undue hardship on the employer,” or (3) 
“prohibit the employee from fulfilling any and all of his or her job 
responsibilities.”87 
 
 85. Utah was left out of this. Although the Utah Medical Cannabis Act states that it “provides 
certain state employment discrimination protection for an individual who lawfully uses medical 
cannabis” the implications for employers are not clearly stated in the law as it currently exists. See 
H.B. 3001, 62d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Utah 2018). 
 86. NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.800 (2017). 
 87. Id. 
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2. Silence is Golden 
The next group of jurisdictions are silent as to accommodations but do allow 
employers to prohibit the use of marijuana in the workplace and/or allow 
employers to prohibit employees being under the influence at work. These 
include Arizona,88 Arkansas,89 Connecticut,90 Delaware,91 the District of 
Columbia,92 Hawaii,93 Illinois,94 Maryland,95 Minnesota,96 New York,97 North 
Dakota,98 and Oklahoma.99 Thus, the duty to accommodate in these states is 
fairly uncertain. For instance, Illinois prohibits discrimination against an 
employee based “solely for his or her status as a registered qualifying patient.”100 
Notably, the Illinois statute does not prevent discrimination for actual medical 
marijuana use, but rather it only protects employees from discrimination due to 
their status as a qualifying patient101—suggesting that positive drug tests under 
existing substance abuse policies could still permit termination. Connecticut and 
Rhode Island’s protections are worded similarly. An employee’s request for 
accommodation can still be derailed on grounds of undue hardship, direct threat, 
or reasonability102—much in the same way the ADA is designed. Further, 
distinct from the language of the Nevada statute, this category of jurisdictions 
includes language about impairment. Under statutes that use the term 
“impairment,” an employer may be permitted to fire an employee that simply 
shows the physical signs of impairment (like smell or red eyes) without having 
to show that the employee’s marijuana use poses some threat to the workplace. 
For example, Illinois’ definition of impairment includes “specific, articulable 
symptoms while working that decrease or lessen [the employee’s] performance 
. . . including symptoms of the employee’s speech, physical dexterity, agility, 
 
 88. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813(B) (2010). 
 89. ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 3(f)(3)(A)-(C) (LexisNexis 2018). 
 90. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p(b)(3) (2012). 
 91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4907A(a)(3), (b) (2011). 
 92. D.C. CODE § 7-1671.03(d)(1) (2017). 
 93. HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-122(e)(1)-(2) (2015). 
 94. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/50 (2014). 
 95. MD. CODE ANN., Health-Gen. § 13-3313(a) (LexisNexis 2018) (Implications for 
employers are not clearly stated, although the statute says that qualifying patients may not be 
subject to any civil or administrative penalty, including disciplinary action by a professional 
licensing board, or “be denied any right or privilege” for the medical use of or possession of medical 
cannabis). 
 96. MINN. STAT. § 152.32(3)(c)(2) (2018). 
 97. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018). 
 98. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 19-24.1-34.2 (West 2017). 
 99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 425(B) (2018). 
 100. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/40(a)(1) (2014). 
 101. Id. § 130/40(a)(2). 
 102. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p(b)(3) (2012); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.6-7(b)(2). 
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coordination, demeanor, irrational or unusual behavior.”103 This broad language 
is extremely problematic, as it leaves employees at the will of their employer’s 
subjective judgments about their behavior. Coupled with the already ineffective 
methods of urinalysis drug testing determining use rather than impairment, it is 
easy to see how even these statutes leave patient-employees severely at risk.  
3. Explicitly Not Required to Accommodate In the Workplace 
The third group consists of Alaska,104 California,105 Colorado,106 Florida,107 
Georgia,108 Maine,109 Massachusetts,110 Michigan,111 Missouri,112 Montana,113 
New Hampshire,114 New Jersey,115 New Mexico,116 Ohio,117 Oregon,118 
Pennsylvania,119 Rhode Island,120 Vermont,121 Washington,122 and West 
Virginia.123 The statutes in these states explicitly do not require an employer to 
accommodate during work hours or on work premises. Oregon’s Medical 
Marijuana Act, for instance, specifically provides that an employer has no duty 
to accommodate an employee who uses medical marijuana.124 Outside of one 
recent case in Rhode Island, courts interpreting these ‘no accommodation’ 
statutes consistently held that because marijuana is a Schedule I drug under the 
 
 103. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/50(f) (2014). 
 104. ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.040(d)(1) (2018). 
 105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.785(a) (West 2017). 
 106. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(10)(b). 
 107. FLA. STAT. § 381.986(15) (2018). 
 108. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-191(f) (2017). 
 109. ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 2426(2)(B) (2017). 
 110. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 369, § 6(D) (West 2012). 
 111. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.26427(c)(2) (2008). 
 112. MO. CONST. art. XVI, § 1(7)(d). 
 113. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-320(4)(b) (2017). 
 114. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-X:3(III)(c) (2016). 
 115. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2019). 
 116. Although there are no specific authorizations to discharge or discipline employees for 
marijuana use on the job, the law specifies that criminal prosecution and civil penalty are authorized 
for marijuana possession or use in the workplace. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-5.A. (2007); see also 
Garcia v. Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1229 (D.N.M. 2016) (finding that an employer 
need not accommodate an employee’s use of medical marijuana). 
 117. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.28(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 118. OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.794 (2018). 
 119. 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10231.2103 (West 2016). 
 120. 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28.6-7 (West 2018). 
 121. Vermont’s statute is a criminal statute, but there is a carve out that individuals may be 
subject to arrest or prosecution for being under the influence of marijuana while in a workplace. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4474c(a)(1)(B) (West 2018). 
 122. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060(4) (West 2016). 
 123. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16A-15-4(b)(2) (West 2017). 
 124. OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.794 (2018). 
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CSA and thus illegal under federal law, an employer has no duty to 
accommodate the marijuana-using employee under the ADA.125  
A number of jurisdictions also carve out a federal law exception including: 
Arizona,126 Arkansas,127 Delaware,128 Illinois,129 Maine,130 Massachusetts,131 
Minnesota,132 New York,133 Ohio,134 Oklahoma,135 Pennsylvania,136 and West 
Virginia.137 This subcategory of jurisdictions allows an employer to argue that 
accommodating medical marijuana would be an undue hardship because doing 
so would cause the employer itself to violate federal law. These statutes typically 
provide that the state marijuana law does not require the employer to put a 
monetary or licensing benefit under existing federal law or regulation at risk.  
In sum, statutes authorizing medical marijuana use for qualifying patients 
vary tremendously throughout the U.S. The importance of this language is 
evidenced by the court precedent developing in states with and without 
protections. 
C. State Court Decisions and the Importance of Anti-Discrimination 
Provisions 
Recent decisions in Connecticut and Massachusetts have set a new course 
for protecting employee use of medical marijuana by utilizing state anti-
discrimination provisions. Even in the absence of such a provision, a Rhode 
Island trial court found in favor of the employee.138 Precedent is starting to build 
toward the proposition that the CSA does not preempt the provisions when 
medical marijuana is used outside the workplace. These rulings provide a 
strikingly new approach that impacts employers, especially in states with laws 
that prohibit discrimination. To clarify the importance of these differences, this 
section will first examine recent court decisions stemming from states with laws 
 
 125. See generally Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prod., Inc., 134 P.3d 161 (Or. 2006); Roe v. 
TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt. (Colorado) LLC, 742, 257 P.3d 586 (2011); Ross v. RagingWire 
Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (2008). 
 126. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813(B)(2) (2010). 
 127. ARK. CONST. amend. 98, § 3(f)(1) (2016). 
 128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4905A(a)(2) (West 2011). 
 129. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/50 (West 2014). 
 130. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E(2) (2017); see also Bourgoin v. Twin Rivers Paper 
Co., 187 A.3d 10, 22 (Me. 2018) (finding that an employer was not required to pay for workers’ 
compensation claimant’s medical marijuana because that would conflict with federal law). 
 131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C, § 1-7(F) (West 2013). 
 132. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.32(3)(c) (West 2014). 
 133. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3369(2) (McKinney 2018). 
 134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.28(A)(4) (West 2016). 
 135. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425(B) (West 2018). 
 136. 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10231.2103(b)(3) (West 2016). 
 137. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16A-15-4(b)(3) (West 2017). 
 138. ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. 98, § 3(f)(1) (2016). 
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prohibiting discrimination, then analyze prior decisions of state court’s in 
jurisdictions without laws explicitly prohibiting discrimination. 
1. Accommodating Use Outside the Workplace 
The first of these cases is Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp, in which 
a Rhode Island trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff-employee 
who was denied hire as a paid intern after her disclosure that she had a medical 
marijuana card and would therefore fail the employer’s drug test.139 Notably, the 
employer’s policy only prohibited the use of drugs on company property.140 The 
plaintiff filed suit both under the Hawkins-Salter Act (which authorizes the use 
of medical marijuana) and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act.141  
First, the court rejected the employer’s argument that the plaintiff was not 
refused hiring because of her status as a cardholder, but rather, because she failed 
the pre-employment drug test; the court found her status as a cardholder or as a 
user of medical marijuana was indistinguishable, because it is impossible to 
imagine protecting the cardholder status while believing “that a patient 
cardholder might never use medical marijuana.”142  In addition, the statute states 
that a qualifying patient cardholder cannot be denied “any right or privilege . . . 
for the medical use of marijuana” and while employment is “not a right or 
privilege in the legal sense,” the provision mandating that an employer may not 
refuse employment on the basis of her status as a cardholder is such a right.143 
Accordingly, the court concluded an employer who denies employment based 
on use of medical marijuana is, in effect, denying her for her status as a 
cardholder and therefore is in violation of the Hawkins-Slater Act.144  
Next, the court considered the second part of the Hawkins-Slater Act that 
states the use of medical marijuana need not be accommodated by an employer 
in the workplace. The court found the provision indicated “the general Assembly 
contemplated that the statute would, in some way, require employers to 
accommodate the medical use of marijuana outside the workplace.”145 In 
response to the employer’s argument that they would be required to 
accommodate an employee who comes to work after staying up all night using 
medical marijuana, the court determined the Act did in fact not require such 
accommodation and that employers would not have to tolerate an employee 
coming to work under the influence.146 Moreover, on the issue of a sufficient 
 
 139. Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp., No. PC-2014-5680, 2017 WL 2321181, at *3 (R.I. 
Super. May 23, 2017). 
 140. Id. at *21. 
 141. Id. at *3. 
 142. Id. at *8. 
 143. Id. at *5. 
 144. Callaghan, 2017 WL 2321181, at *14–15. 
 145. Id. at *7. 
 146. Id. at *9. 
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accommodation, the court found the employer’s burden would be minimal, 
because they would not need to “make existing facilities readily accessible,” 
“restructure jobs,” “modify work schedules,” or even alter their existing drug 
policy, because the current policy only prohibited alcohol and drug use on 
company property.147 
Finally, the court addressed the “final arrow in [the employer’s] quiver,” the 
issue of federal preemption by the CSA.148 Notably, the court recognized the 
purpose of the CSA was never intended to regulate employment and anti-
discrimination laws like the Hawkins-Slater Act. While the CSA may be 
implicated when drugs are used in the workplace, the Act explicitly mandated 
that accommodations need not be made for medical marijuana use in the 
workplace.149 Thus, it was not impossible to comply with both the CSA and the 
Hawkins-Slater Act, because employers could not be in violation of the CSA by 
employing someone who uses medical marijuana outside the workplace.  
Following in the footsteps of the Callaghan court, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Connecticut held in Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 
LLC that federal law does not preempt Connecticut’s Palliative Use of Marijuana 
Act (PUMA), largely because PUMA contained a provision explicitly 
prohibiting employers from discriminating against qualifying patients.150 In 
Noffsinger, the plaintiff filed a complaint under PUMA’s anti-discrimination 
provision after having her job offer rescinded after testing positive for marijuana 
in a pre-employment drug test due to treating her disability with a synthetic 
cannabis pill.151 The employer moved to dismiss, arguing that PUMA’s anti-
discrimination provision is preempted by the CSA, the ADA, and the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.152  
First, the employer argued that PUMA was “an impermissible obstacle to 
the basic purpose of the CSA” and was therefore preempted, because as a 
Schedule I substance, the CSA prohibits the manufacture, distribution, 
dispensation, and possession of marijuana.153 In rejecting this contention, the 
court concluded the CSA does not make it illegal to employ a marijuana user.154 
The court found the CSA does not purport to regulate employment practices in 
any manner, and thus, PUMA’s anti-discrimination provision did not stand in 
 
 147. Id. at *10. 
 148. Id. at *13. 
 149. Callaghan, 2017 WL 2321181, at *13. 
 150. Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co. LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 326, 331, 338 (D. Conn. 
2017). 
 151. Id. at 331–32. 
 152. Id. at 332–33. 
 153. Id. at 333–34. 
 154. Id. at 336. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE ADA 409 
the way of or conflict with the CSA.155 While the court acknowledged that other 
state and federal courts have evaluated other state medical marijuana statutes—
even in the employment context—and came to different conclusions, it found 
them to be readily distinguishable, because the statutory provisions at issue in 
those cases were not analogous to the anti-discrimination provision of PUMA.156  
The court analyzed the several provisions of the ADA pertaining to illegal 
drug use and reached the following conclusions. First, it found that the ADA’s 
language explicitly allows for employers to place a prohibition on the “illegal 
use of drugs and the use of alcohol at the workplace by all employees.”157 The 
court recognized that: 
[T]he fact that the ADA does not further provide that an employer may prohibit 
an employee from illegal use of drugs outside the workplace is a powerful 
indication that the ADA did not mean to regulate non-workplace activities, much 
less preclude State’s from prohibiting employers from taking adverse action 
against employees engaged in the use of illegal drugs outside of the workplace, 
especially when such use does not affect job performance.158 
Moreover, it found that although the ADA refers to employer drug testing, it did 
so for the limited purpose of clarifying that drug testing is not itself a violation 
of the ADA when intended to confirm an individual who undergoes a drug 
rehabilitation program is “no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs.”159 The 
court explained that this authorization was intended to serve a limited purpose 
and not intended as an “employer’s ‘Magna Carta’ to engage in drug testing.”160 
The court made note of the language in § 12114(d)(2), which clarifies that this 
authorization shall not “be construed to encourage, prohibit, or authorize” drug 
testing of employees or applications.161 
The Callaghan and Noffsinger courts put forth well-reasoned analyses of 
state anti-discrimination laws and their relation to federal policy, specifically the 
CSA and ADA. While the Noffsinger court would not go as far as to say that 
employers are required to provide a reasonable accommodation to medical 
marijuana users, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was willing to do so.162 This 
Comment began by detailing the revocation of Christina Barbuto’s offer of 
employment following her positive drug test for marijuana, which was 
 
 155. Noffsinger, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 338. The court further relied on the provision that explicitly 
indicates that Congress did not intend for the CSA to preempt state law “unless there is a positive 
conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot 
consistently stand together.” Id. at 336. 
 156. Id. at 338–40. 
 157. Id. at 337 (emphasis in original). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Noffsinger, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 336. 
 160. Id. at 337. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Barbuto v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 78 N.E.3d 37, 45 (Mass. 2017). 
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prescribed to treat her underlying disability, Crohn’s disease.163 Barbuto filed a 
claim against her former employer alleging handicap discrimination and 
unlawful termination.164 The court found Barbuto’s claim fit squarely in the 
protections of the state’s medical marijuana statute, which “forbids denial of any 
right or privilege on the basis of medical marijuana use.”165 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court explained: 
[T]o declare an accommodation for medical marijuana to be per se unreasonable 
out of respect for Federal law would not be respectful of the recognition of 
Massachusetts voters, shared by the legislatures of voters in the vast majority of 
States, that marijuana has an accepted medical use for some patients suffering 
from debilitating medical conditions.166 
The court also rejected defendant-employer’s argument that even if Barbuto 
were a “qualified handicapped person,” she was terminated because she failed a 
drug test that all employees are required to pass, not because of her handicap.167 
In reaching this conclusion, the court explained: “[T]he medical condition that 
renders her handicapped, and the employer fires her because company policy 
prohibits the use of this medication, the law does not ignore the fact that the 
policy resulted in a person being denied employment because of her 
handicap.”168 Under the defendant’s logic, a company barring the use of insulin 
by its employees in accordance with a company policy would not be 
discriminating against diabetics because of their handicap but would be 
implementing a company policy prohibiting the use of a medication.169 In sum, 
the court found it was appropriate to recognize handicap discrimination in 
circumstances like Barbuto’s, because terminating an employee for violating 
company policy effectively denies an employee with a handicap the opportunity 
of a reasonable accommodation.170  
2. No Anti-Discrimination Provision, No Accommodation 
The cases discussed above exemplify the vitality of explicit statutory 
language protecting medical marijuana patients, so long as they are not using or 
impaired by medical marijuana in the workplace. Until these cases, in various 
contexts, the highest state courts in California, Oregon, Washington, and 
Montana have all found that states cannot actually require employers to 
accommodate medical marijuana use due to the federal prohibition under the 
 
 163. Id. at 41. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 41. 
 166. Id. at 46. 
 167. Barbuto, 78 N.E.3d at 47. 
 168. Id. at 47. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 47–48. 
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CSA.171 While factually consistent with the cases discussed above, these cases 
were not dealing with anti-discrimination provisions of state law. While not 
exhaustive, the remainder of this section will analyze some of these prior 
opinions favoring employers and argue they are readily distinguishable from the 
opinions coming out of states with anti-discrimination provisions. 
In Ross v. RagingWire, the Supreme Court of California reviewed the lower 
court’s rejection of a plaintiff’s complaint alleging his employer violated the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act by discharging him for his disability.172 The 
plaintiff suffered from severe back pain from injuries he sustained while serving 
in the United States Air Force.173 He used marijuana under California’s 
Compassionate Use Act (CUA) to treat his pain symptoms.174 After beginning 
work at defendant-employer, Ross was required to take a drug test.175 When the 
results were returned that indicated Ross was using marijuana, the employer 
terminated him.176 Ross subsequently filed suit, claiming his termination 
violated state law prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of a 
medical condition.177  The court found that because the CUA was without 
explicit language protecting patients from discrimination based on such use, it 
should defer to the federal law’s prohibition of marijuana.178 Even though the 
statute in question dealt with housing, not employment, the court’s analysis 
indicates that in either case, had California enacted a statute similar to that of 
Connecticut or Massachusetts, Ross may have been granted anti-discrimination 
protection.179 
Colorado’s seminal case on employee marijuana use is the Coats case, in 
which an off-duty employee consumed marijuana to treat painful muscle spasms 
caused by his quadriplegia.180 Coats was terminated after failing a random drug 
test in violation of the employer’s drug policy, despite using marijuana in 
compliance with Colorado’s medical marijuana law.181 The issue in this case 
was whether the use of marijuana in compliance with Colorado’s medical 
marijuana statute—but in violation of federal law—was a “lawful” activity 
under Colorado’s “lawful activities statute,” which prohibits terminating an 
 
 171. Dustin Carlton, Medical Marijuana in the Workplace: Where Do Things Stand?, HRDIVE 
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.hrdive.com/news/medical-marijuana-in-the-workplace-where-do-
things-stand/517229/. 
 172. Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 202 (Cal. 2008). 
 173. Id. at 203. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). 
 176. Ross, 174 P.3d at 203. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. at 206–07. 
 179. See id. at 215–16 (Kennard, J. concurring and dissenting). 
 180. Coats v. Dish Network, 350 P.3d 849, 850 (Colo. 2015). 
 181. Id. 
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employee due to participation in a lawful activity while not at work.182 The court 
found an activity must be permitted by both federal and state law to be 
“lawful.”183 Because marijuana was illegal under the CSA, the court held that 
an employee’s off-duty medical marijuana use was not a lawful activity 
protected by Colorado’s lawful activities statute.184 
In 2010, Oregon faced this issue in the case of Emerald Steel Fabricators, 
Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Industry.185 As in Noffsinger, the employee in 
Emerald Steel was fired by his employer one week after disclosing his status as 
a state law-authorized user of medical marijuana.186 Yet, the Oregon Supreme 
Court determined that Oregon’s medical marijuana statute was preempted by the 
CSA.187 Why? Because the Emerald Steel court was interpreting a medical 
marijuana statute that did not contain a provision explicitly barring employment 
discrimination.188 In contrast to cases like Noffsinger where the court was faced 
with a question of whether the CSA preempts a provision that prohibits an 
employer from taking adverse action against an employee on the basis of the 
employee’s otherwise state-authorized medicinal use of marijuana, the question 
for the Emerald Steel court was whether the CSA more generally preempted a 
provision of Oregon law that authorized the use of medicinal marijuana.189 
The drastically different outcomes of the cases discussed in this section 
evidence the importance of explicit statutory language prohibiting 
discrimination against qualifying patients. Because of the nearly identical nature 
of the statutes at issue in Barbuto and Noffsinger as compared to the ADA, these 
rationales can and should be applied to the ADA in order to provide employee-
patients protection from disability discrimination.  
V.  ADOPTING STATE COURT RATIONALES ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
The quickest and most effective means of alleviating the problems facing an 
employee-patient is the rescheduling of marijuana under the CSA. While the 
rescheduling of marijuana is outside the scope of this Comment, it must be noted 
as the best possible solution. Due to a shift in marijuana enforcement policy 
between the Obama and Trump administrations, the likelihood that marijuana is 
rescheduled in the near future seems miniscule.190  
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Even without rescheduling, the state court decisions of Barbuto and 
Noffsinger provide a well-reasoned framework for analyzing medical marijuana 
patient protections under state law that should be applied in the ADA context. 
The court in Noffsinger reached several conclusions about various sub-
provisions of § 12114, the illegal use of drugs provision, that contest crucial 
arguments for pre-emption of these state laws and clarify the application of the 
ADA to conduct in the workplace.191 This Part will highlight the key points of 
the Noffsinger and Barbuto courts and argue that they can and should be adopted 
into ADA jurisprudence.  
First and foremost, individuals who are prescribed medical marijuana only 
qualify for such a prescription when they are found to have an underlying 
disability, as defined under state law. The reasoning of the court in Noffsinger 
and Barbuto struck to the core of this problem. As the court explained in 
Barbuto:  
[W]here a handicapped employee needs medication to manage the medical 
condition that renders her handicapped, and the employer fires her because 
company policy prohibits the use of this medication, the law does not ignore the 
fact that the policy resulted in a person being denied employment because of her 
handicap.192 
One case filed by the EEOC shows signs that disabled individuals using 
medical marijuana can be protected in certain circumstances. Just as importantly, 
however, it shows the inherent impossibility of separating an employee’s use of 
medical marijuana to treat their disability from the disability itself. In EEOC v. 
The Pines of Clarkston, the EEOC alleged The Pines violated the ADA when it 
terminated Ms. Holden because the drug test conducted on her second day of 
work revealed marijuana use.193 However, instead of bringing a failure to 
accommodate claim, the EEOC claimed that The Pines terminated her upon 
learning about her disability.194 This was because following the failed drug test, 
the employee informed that the positive drug test was due to treating her 
disability, epilepsy, with medical marijuana. While the employer’s rationale for 
denying Ms. Holden’s employment was purportedly her lack of candor about 
her use of medical marijuana as treatment before hire, there was evidence that 
this justification was unfounded.195 During her initial interview, the employer 
asked questions about her disability, and officials expressed concern that she 
could not “handle the stress” of the position and ultimately recommended that 
the company “not hire her for medical issues.”196 The court ultimately denied 
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the employer’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the shifting 
rationales could be evidence of pretext.197  
There are three important ideas to be taken from The Pines that are central 
to the position advanced in this Comment. First, it indicates the EEOC is not 
completely unwilling to protect medical marijuana patients. Second, it illustrates 
that medical marijuana patients may be protected by the ADA upon a showing 
that the discrimination is based on the underlying disability and not the 
marijuana use. Third, and most importantly, it shows the inherent difficulty and 
confusion in trying to separate an individual’s underlying disability from her 
medical marijuana use to treat it, exactly the problem discussed in Barbuto, 
Callaghan, and Noffsinger. While encouraging, the EEOC’s position in The 
Pines does not go far enough and should instead be expanded to protect not only 
individuals like Ms. Holden, but all individuals facing adverse treatment based 
on their use of medical marijuana in treating their underlying disability.  
Moreover, the ADA never intended to regulate the illegal use of drugs 
outside the workplace. The ADA explicitly provides that an employer “may 
prohibit the illegal use of drugs and use of alcohol at the workplace by all 
employees.”198 The Noffsinger court aptly pointed out that the fact that the ADA 
does not further provide that an employer may prohibit an employee from the 
illegal use of drugs outside the workplace. This is a powerful indicator that the 
ADA was not meant to regulate non-workplace activities, much less to preclude 
the states from doing so or to preclude the states from prohibiting employers 
from taking adverse actions against employees who may use illegal drugs 
outside the workplace, and whose drug use does not affect job performance.199 
Furthermore, the purpose of the exclusion of individuals engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs was never intended to allow discrimination against disabled 
individuals for their use of drugs under the supervision of licensed professionals. 
While the unreported decisions in James and Barber have clarified the current 
treatment of medical marijuana under the ADA, they also show how far the 
“illegal use of drugs” provision has drifted from its original purpose. The 
exclusion of individuals engaging in the illegal use of drugs was never intended 
to allow discrimination against individuals for the use of drugs as treatment for 
their disabilities. Moreover, the argument that treatment of the disability is 
somehow separate from the disability itself finds little support when legislative 
intent and history behind the ADA is examined.200 
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As argued by the plaintiff in James, the initial draft of the ADA did not 
exclude coverage for those engaged in the illegal use of drugs.201 That exclusion 
was later added in response to drug abuse under the Rehabilitation Act.202 The 
rationale being, as one senator put it, that the war on drugs would fail if drug 
abusers could “hide behind the laws designed to help those who are seriously 
handicapped.”203 The main concern was that individuals would claim current 
drug use or addiction as a disability covered by the ADA.204 In the present 
context, however, medical marijuana users are not seeking to have their 
prescription drug use treated as a disability. These patients already have 
underlying disabilities, which service as the basis for an ADA claim. “The ADA 
addresses drug use as disability and says nothing about drug use as treatment,” 
although holdings in cases like James may imply otherwise.205 
The Legislature published a report that was released prior to passage of the 
ADA with the intent to clarify that persons with disabilities taking medications 
with physician supervision were not going to be affected:  
The term “illegal drugs” is defined in section 101(5) and does not include drugs 
taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional. The exempted 
category includes, for example, experimental drugs taken under supervision. 
Many people with disabilities, such as people with epilepsy, AIDS, and mental 
illness, take a variety of drugs, including experimental drugs, under supervision 
by a health care professional. Discrimination on the basis of such drugs would 
not be allowed.206 
This passage’s focus on experimental drugs is used as an example; however, “it 
places special emphasis on whether or not a particular drug is used pursuant to 
licensed supervision.”207 This further “supports an understanding of ‘illegal use 
of drugs’ that allows for supervised medical use regardless of a drug’s status 
under criminal statutes like the CSA.”208 The refusal of the EEOC to protect 
medical marijuana patients is incompatible with the strong legislative history 
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indicating that prescription drug treatment should not disqualify disabled 
persons from seeking the protection of the ADA.209  
The approach this Comment advocates for is not a complete authorization 
of medical marijuana in the workplace. In fact, employers can and should 
maintain their drug policies, while also making exceptions when dealing with 
qualifying medical marijuana patients. The approach should reflect how 
employers currently treat employees using such other major prescription drugs 
such as opiates or benzodiazepines. Along those lines, a decision from a federal 
district court in Tennessee may provide a useful means of analyzing the context 
of legal prescription drugs with significant side effects. In Bates v. Dura 
Automotive, employees previously held a wide range of manufacturing duties, 
including work with heavy machinery.210 The employer instituted a policy that 
“employees could not use legal prescription drugs if such use adversely affected 
safety, company property, or job performance.”211 Seven employees tested 
positive for drugs the company deemed dangerous (Oxycodone, Lortab, Xanex, 
etc).212 These employees were subsequently terminated and brought suit under 
the ADA.213 
The employer argued that its facility was a dangerous place to work with 
significant safety issues that justified its policies regarding legal prescription 
drug use.214 However, the district court found that the employer was not entitled 
to summary judgment on all claims, as material questions of fact existed whether 
the company’s testing protocol was “broader and more intrusive than necessary” 
because it categorically “excluded all employees” from using such drugs 
“without any regard for individualized circumstances.”215 The court concluded 
that “the utter inflexibility of the employer’s policy precludes summary 
judgment.”216 
Although the Sixth Circuit ultimately reversed the district court on other 
grounds,217 the analysis is a useful guide that should be used when dealing with 
an employee’s medical marijuana use as treatment for their underlying 
disability. Disabled employees who find marijuana to be the only treatment that 
alleviates their suffering should not be punished by the government. The 
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uncertain status of marijuana under the ADA has had a chilling effect on 
individuals otherwise eligible to bring claims related to medical marijuana. 
Employers need to know how they should treat employees who use medical 
marijuana. Employees need to know that they can pursue treatment for their 
disabilities without fear of losing their jobs or being subject to criminal 
sanctions.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Individuals with disabilities should not be forced to choose between 
effective treatment and gainful employment. As many as 2.5 million disabled 
individuals rely on medical marijuana, and this number continues to rise as more 
states legalize medical marijuana. Medical marijuana enables these individuals 
to work, care for themselves, and effectively manage their disabilities. These 
individuals should not be excluded from ADA protection or from the workplace 
based on treatment that is legal under state law. The purpose of the ADA is to 
regulate the employment relationship and ensure that disabled individuals are 
provided the same opportunities as all others, yet to date, it has bowed to the will 
of federal drug policy rather than fulfill its purpose. The ADA framework is fully 
capable of protecting employers while living up to its ideal of eliminating 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and it is time for the ADA 
to start doing so. 
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